An American Right to Be Forgotten by Dowdell, John W.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 52 Issue 2 Article 23 
Winter 2017 
An American Right to Be Forgotten 
John W. Dowdell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John W. Dowdell, An American Right to Be Forgotten, 52 Tulsa L. Rev. 311 (2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss2/23 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
  
311 
AN AMERICAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
John W. Dowdell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1890, America’s “Father of Psychology,” William James, wrote that “[i]n the 
practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as important as recollecting.”1 That same year, 
eventual Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis and his Harvard Law classmate 
Samuel D. Warren co-authored The Right to Privacy.2 The stated purpose of the latter 
was “to consider whether the existing law afford[ed] a principle which [could] 
properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it [did], what the 
nature and extent of such protection [was].”3 While the legal protection of individual 
privacy rights in the United States has progressed slowly through the common law in 
the century and a quarter since Brandeis and Warren first argued in its defense, the 
European Union (“E.U.”) has made considerable strides in the protection of its citi-
zens’ privacy rights.4 As a result, citizens of all twenty-eight E.U. member states enjoy 
the strongest online privacy right to date, known most commonly as the right to be 
forgotten.5 
The E.U.’s measures in protecting individual online privacy rights, although im-
perfect, are necessary in the relatively unknown but rapidly changing Internet age.6 
In our modern world, where Americans are increasingly complacent about mass data 
retention and increasingly careless as to the content of online postings, it is time to 
reexamine if, and at what level, the United States has or needs a right to online pri-
vacy, and how that right may comport with the E.U.’s right to be forgotten. 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law, 2017. Thanks to my parents, John and Rochelle Dowdell, 
for their inspiration and unwavering support, and for the guidance and counsel of Christine Little and James Blake-
more, two of the best writers I know. 
 1. WILLIAM JAMES, TEXT-BOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 300 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 3. Id. at 197. 
 4. Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 Nova. L. Rev. 289, 289-90 (2002) 
(“American privacy law is surprisingly weak. If privacy law were a stock, its performance over the last century would 
not be deemed impressive. It has been a consistently poor achiever, barely keeping up with inflation.”); See also Megan 
Richardson & Andrew T. Kenyon, Privacy Online: Reform Beyond Law Reform, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY 
LAW 338 (Witzleb et al. eds., 2012) (noting “the century’s worth of privacy tort reform that followed the article has 
produced no privacy utopia in the United States.”).  
 5. Council Directive, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 95/46/EC, 
1995 O.J. (L 281/31). 
 6. THERESA M. PAYTON & THEODORE CLAYPOOLE, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: RECOGNIZING 
THREATS, DEFENDING YOUR RIGHTS, AND PROTECTING YOUR FAMILY 1 (2015). 
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Part II of this note frames the issues it seeks to resolve, and then examines 
Europe’s cultural history regarding privacy—including legislation and case law—and 
explains the development of the right to be forgotten.7 Part III notes the spread of 
the right to be forgotten into the Western Hemisphere, and discusses its implica-
tions.8 Part IV chronologically discusses privacy law developments in the United 
States, including both common law and constitutional interpretations.9 Part V briefly 
acknowledges arguments against the creation of a right to be forgotten in the United 
States.10 Finally, Part VI argues that E.U. and U.S. perspectives on individual online 
privacy rights are not irreconcilable, and that the right to be forgotten can be adopted 
in the United States in a precisely tailored and improved form.11 
II. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
The Internet is the most significant technological advancement in generations, 
dramatically changing the way the world collects, communicates, and disseminates 
information.12 Despite the Internet’s undeniable contributions to society, it has trig-
gered a new normal where forgetting is the exception, and remembering is the 
norm.13 The retention—or remembering—of every action of every person using the 
Internet has the potential to adversely affect people on and offline; and the conse-
quences of unchecked data retention range from minor reputational harm, to harm 
that is severe and sometimes shocking.14 For an example of the latter, consider the 
tragedy of the Catsouras family.15 In 2006, a recent high school graduate named Nikki 
Catsouras was decapitated when she crashed her father’s Porsche into a concrete 
tollbooth while driving on a highway in Southern California.16 The coroner did not 
even allow Nikki’s parents to identify the body because “[t]he manner of death was 
so horrific.”17 Still, images from the scene of the accident were leaked when two 
California Highway Patrol employees emailed them to friends and family members 
for amusement on Halloween day.18 Mr. Catsouras quickly learned that the only via-
ble way to remove the photographs from the Internet in the United States is through 
copyright law.19 When the Catsouras’ attorney was unable to purchase the photos 
                                                          
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See infra Part VI. 
 12. Russell L. Weaver, David F. Partlett & Mark D. Cole, Protection Privacy in the Digital Age, in THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY IN THE LIGHT OF MEDIA CONVERGENCE 1-3 (Dieter Dörr & Russell L. Weaver eds., 2012). 
 13. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2 (2009). 
 14. Id. at 1-15. 
 15. Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion: In Europe, the right to be forgotten trumps the Internet, THE NEW YORKER, 
September 29, 2014 Issue. 
 16. Jessica Bennett, One Family’s Fight Against Grisly Web Photos, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2004, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/one-familys-fight-against-grisly-web-photos-77275.  
 17. Toobin, supra note 15.  
 18. Bennett, supra note 16.  
 19. Toobin, supra note 15. 
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from the California Highway Patrol, the family had no alternatives—legal or other-
wise.20 The gruesome photographs of Nikki Catsouras are still accessible today 
through a simple search on Google.21 
In the aggregate, however, far more harm stems from the retention of seemingly 
innocuous online content.22 Examples abound.23 For instance, a university in Penn-
sylvania denied an otherwise qualified twenty-five year old a teaching certificate due 
solely to a picture she posted of herself—captioned “drunken pirate”—in which she 
was dressed as a pirate and holding a cup.24 In the United Kingdom, a woman found 
herself unemployed because of her Facebook post referring to her job as “dull.”25 In 
2003, Ghyslain Raza—also known as “Star Wars Kid”—dropped out of school as a 
result of bullying after his classmates posted a video of him pretending to be in a light 
saber battle.26 He entered a child’s psychiatric ward.27 
Most people simply want to erase their online histories for posterity.28 A busi-
nesswoman in Florida, for example, asked a committee there to take down a story of 
her, at age nineteen, in which she is quoted about interviewing for a position with a 
“naked maids” cleaning service.29 These are just a few of the thousands of individuals 
petitioning for the erasure of a miniscule fraction of their online histories—220,000 
of which have been made to Google as of February 2015.30 
The issue spans internationally due to the global nature of the Internet.31 Inter-
net use and accessibility are rapidly expanding, and avoiding the Internet is impracti-
cable, particularly in the United States.32 A 2007 Pew Research survey illustrating this 
point found that nearly two-thirds of American teenagers regularly participated in 
                                                          
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. see generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
2-3 (2009). 
 23. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, July 21, 2010 
(explaining that “[e]xamples are proliferating daily . . .”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/maga-
zine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. 
 24. Brian Krebs, Court Rules Against Teacher in MySpace ‘Drunken Pirate’ Case, SECURITY FIX (Dec. 3, 2008, 5:05 
PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/12/court_rules_against_teacher_in.html.  
 25. Andrew Levy, Teenage Office Worker Sacked for Moaning on Facebook About Her “Totally Boring” Job, THE DAILY 
MAIL, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1155971/Teenage-office-worker-sacked-moaning-
Facebook-totally-boring-job.html. 
 26. Eric Pfeiffer, 10 Years Later, ‘Star Wars Kid’ Speaks, THE SIDESHOW (May 10, 2013, 7:13 PM), http://news.ya-
hoo.com/blogs/sideshow/10-years-later-star-wars-kid-speaks-231310357.html. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Sylvia Tippmann & Julia Powles, Google Accidentally Reveals Data on ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Requests, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 9:28 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/14/google-accidentally-
reveals-right-to-be-forgotten-requests. 
 29. Terry Carter, Erasing the News: Should Some Stories be Forgotten?, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2017, 12:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/right_to_be_forgotten_US_law/. 
 30. Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our Right to be Forgotten, THE GUARDIAN (February 
18, 2015, 2:30 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-
search. 
 31. Cf. Russell L. Weaver, David F. Partlett & Mark D. Cole, Protection Privacy in the Digital Age, in THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY IN THE LIGHT OF MEDIA CONVERGENCE 2-3 (Dieter Dörr & Russell L. Weaver eds., 2012). 
 32. Payton & Claypoole, supra note 6, at 14 (“The Internet was born in the 1980s and rocketed into all of our 
homes through the 1990s and early 2000s, becoming a necessity of life for many, including nearly everyone in the 
industrialized world.”). 
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one of the many content-creating activities on the Internet.33 This suggests that con-
tent-creating activities, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, are now insepara-
ble from youth culture.34 As these younger generations age, particularly in America, 
they will not have a luxury their parents took for granted: the ability to conceal or 
mitigate reputational damage from minor and often harmless missteps, follies, and 
lapses in judgment.35 
The indefinite retention of every aspect of an individual’s online activity is an 
urgent problem; and the United States and Europe are at odds regarding the solu-
tion.36 To understand the divergent approaches and how each developed, we must 
acknowledge—according to Yale Law professor and Guggenheim Fellow James Q. 
Whitman—that “on the two sides of the Atlantic, [there are] two different cultures 
of privacy, which are home to different intuitive sensibilities . . . .”37 To Professor 
Whitman, the divergence between contemporary conceptions of privacy in the laws 
of the E.U. and the U.S. boils down to a view of privacy as an aspect of dignity in the 
former, and as an aspect of liberty in the latter.38 Neither approach is objectively 
superior to the other; rather, each is a product of “contrasting political and social 
ideals,” developed throughout history.39 How Europeans arrived at a view of privacy 
through the lens of dignity, and Americans through the lens of liberty, therefore re-
quires an examination of European and American culture throughout history.40 
A. Europe’s Embrace of Privacy Rights and the Emergence of the Online Right to be Forgotten 
There is no consensus on the period of European history with the most influ-
ence on the continent’s attitude toward privacy.41 For example, Viktor Mayer-Schön-
berger, recognized as one of the intellectual godfathers of the right to be forgotten, 
believes that Europe’s data protection laws are a product of twentieth century turmoil 
in Europe.42 He points specifically to a Dutch National Registry, which “enabled the 
Nazis to identify 73% of Dutch Jews, compared with just 25% in . . . France,” where 
such robust records did not exist.43 This is the explanation most commonly offered 
                                                          
 33. Kathryn Zickuhr, “Teen Content Creators,” Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 2009), at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/11/18/teen-content-creators/ (accessed Nov. 11, 2015). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Supra note 12, at 3. 
 36. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawre-
view.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten. 
 37. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1153, 1160 (2004); 
see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 26 (1967) (noting that “[i]t is important to realize that different 
historical and political traditions among contemporary democratic nations have created different types of over-all 
social balances of privacy.”). 
 38. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1153, 1161-62 
(2004). 
 39. Id. at 1164. 
 40. Id.  
 41. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 136-37 
(2009) (arguing that heightened information privacy in Europe is the result of “Europe’s violent and brutal twentieth-
century history.”); But see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012) (pointing to 
the centuries old French law of le droit à l’oubli as the “intellectual roots of the right to be forgotten.”). 
 42. Toobin, supra note 15. 
 43. Private Data, Public Rules, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2012), available at http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/21543489/print. 
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by Europeans themselves.44 Proponents of the Nazi explanation essentially believe 
that the privacy protections Europeans enjoy today are the result of a knee-jerk reac-
tion against fascism, communism, and in particular, Nazism.45 Jeffrey Rosen, Law 
Professor at George Washington University and Legal Affairs Editor of The New Re-
public, emphasizes early French law and specifically the doctrine of le droit à l’oubli.46 
Translated as the “right of oblivion,” le droit à l’oubli allowed French convicts who had 
served their time in prison, and presumably been rehabilitated, to prevent the publi-
cation of their incarceration as well as any details of their alleged crime.47 Similar laws 
that protect dignity, irrespective of social class, still exist today in France, Germany, 
and Great Britain, among others.48 
The theory that Europe’s emphasis on individual privacy rights is rooted in 
centuries of history—and the theory that data protection in particular was born pri-
marily from Nazi occupation—are not mutually exclusive.49 Professor Whitman 
acknowledges a number of factors contributing to European privacy law in the ag-
gregate, including Nazi occupation to a small degree, but concludes that Europe’s 
emphasis on privacy “is the result of a centuries long, slow maturing revolt against 
th[e] style of status privilege.”50 Put differently, while Viktor Mayer-Schönberger is 
correct that the Nazis’ exploitation of centralized information contributed greatly to 
current European digital data protection laws, a cultural value of privacy forms the 
base.51 
Both historically and currently, privacy in Europe is most accurately viewed as 
protecting personal dignity.52 The emphasis on dignity is apparent in light of ancient 
European practices for defending reputation, such as the duel.53 “A duel could be 
provoked by insult, defamation, or gossip . . . Even the slightest of insults could spark 
a duel.”54 This shows the lengths to which European citizens were willing to go in 
order to repair or protect their dignity.55 The extreme reputational remedy, however, 
was reserved to the elite class—the members of which actually had reputations worth 
                                                          
 44. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1165. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Rosen, supra note 36. 
 47. Id. 
 48. On Being Forgotten, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2014, available at http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/21602219/print; See also JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE at 84-92 (2003) (noting in regard to 
punishment in France and Germany, “the obligation of wearing prison uniforms has been generally eliminated.” 
France also bans the use of glass partitions where inmates receive visitors, and Germany provides inmates with 
unemployment insurance, which they receive on release. These laws are intended to maintain the dignity and social 
standing of inmates.). 
 49. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1166 (noting that although the evolution of European privacy law has been “cen-
turies-long . . . much of this leveling up took place during the fascist period . . . .”). 
 50. Id. at 1166-69 (acknowledging factors such as the law of insult, dueling, Nazi history, and “the revolution of 
leveling up.”).  
 51. Id.; See also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
136-37 (2009). 
 52. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1164-65. 
 53. See generally BARBARA HOLLAND, GENTLEMEN’S BLOOD: A HISTORY OF DUELING FROM SWORDS AT 
DAWN TO PISTOLS AT DUSK (2003). 
 54. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 114 (2007). 
 55. Id. 
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protecting.56 Duels were not entirely extrajudicial, and adhered to a set of elaborate 
rules known as the code duello.57 Europeans considered alternative mechanisms for 
protecting dignity, such as the courtroom, cowardly, and the elite class considered 
street fights primitive and reserved for the lower class.58 To depict the pervasiveness 
of dueling in Europe, author Barbara Holland wrote that “[i]n France alone, in just 
the twenty-one years of Henri IV’s reign, 1589 to 1610, perhaps ten thousand gentle-
men died for their honor.”59 The practice eventually gave way to the courts, which 
today, in large part through privacy law, provide similar redress for reputational 
harm.60 
Dueling occurred in America as well but not nearly to the extent as in Europe.61 
In fact, the prevalence of dueling fell drastically following the most famous duel in 
American history: Alexander Hamilton versus Aaron Burr.62 Legal historian and Uni-
versity of Chicago Law professor Alison LaCroix advances a more complex theory 
of dueling’s American demise.63 She posits that dueling faded into obscurity because, 
in America, traditionally aristocratic values such as honor and dignity became less 
important as the nation industrialized.64 One’s reputation for creditworthiness, for 
example, became more important than honor and dignity.65 In Europe, while dueling 
also ceased, the values it defended remained paramount.66 
As laws protecting privacy and dignity supplanted dueling in Europe, the elite 
class remained the only protected class.67 This deeply engrained social hierarchy dur-
ing crucial years of the development of privacy rights distinguishes Europe from the 
United States.68 In nineteenth century England, for example, feudalism was still 
firmly entrenched, whereas in the United States millions of families owned land.69 
While American prosperity was at least outwardly premised on the idea that “all men 
are created equal,” European mobility appeared, and in fact was, less realistic.70 The 
elite class in Europe authored the laws protecting respect and dignity, which resulted 
                                                          
 56. Id.; See also Holland, supra note 53, at 26 (“Gentlemen were careful not to enter into duels with non-gentlemen 
because, if they lost or got killed, it stained the family honor backward and forward for generations.”). 
 57. Jennie C. Meade, The Duel, GW MAGAZINE (2015), available at https://www.gwu.edu/~magazine/ar-
chive/2005_law_fall/docs/feat_duel.html. 
 58. Solove, supra note 54, at 114-15. 
 59. Holland, supra note 53, at 22. 
 60. Solove, supra note 54, at 116. 
 61. Meade, supra note 57 (However, Meade also notes that President Andrew Jackson was believed to have par-
ticipated in over 100 duels during his life). 
 62. Solove, supra note 54, at 116. 
 63. Alison L. LaCroix, To Gain the Whole World and Lose His Own Soul: Nineteenth-Century American Dueling as Public 
Law and Private Code, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 550 (2004). 
 64. Id.  
 65. Solove, supra note 54, at 116. 
 66. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1174.  
 67. See Whitman, supra note 38, at 1169 (explaining that protections were “originally and primarily concerned 
with the doings of very high-status persons.”). 
 68. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER 
REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 26 (2007). 
 69. Id. at 24. 
 70. Id. (Friedman strongly suggests that the quoted language in the Declaration of Independence was a veneer, 
as American mobility was reserved for white Americans: “Of course, nobody ever took this maxim literally. It cer-
tainly never applied to African Americans or for that matter women or Native Americans.”).  
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in the protection of their interests far more than the interests of lower class citizens.71 
An example is France, where social status permeated all areas of life to the extent that 
separate forms of punishment were reserved for persons of different classes and were 
intended to inflict “not merely pain, but dishonor as well.”72 
The French Revolution of the late eighteenth century began eliminating much 
of the disparity between social classes in the eyes of French law.73 Professor Whitman 
presents the argument that “in almost every area of the law [following the French 
Revolution], we see the same drive toward a kind of high-status egalitarianism—an 
egalitarianism that aims to lift everyone up in social standing.”74 This is true across 
continental Europe.75 Laws regarding punishment and privacy—which each stem 
from European concepts of respect and dignity—became impartially applied regard-
less of social class.76 
Widespread adjudication of privacy disputes in Europe began in the mid-nine-
teenth century.77 A highly publicized case demonstrating Europe’s conception of pri-
vacy as a right in post-Revolution France involves Alexandre Dumas père, the French 
author of The Three Musketeers.78 In the later years of his life, Dumas began a romantic 
relationship with Adah Isaacs Menken, a much younger actress from Texas.79 The 
couple posed together for several photographs that were scandalous for nineteenth 
century France.80 When the photographer registered the copyright to the photos, 
which certainly would have been profitable, Dumas sued him for an invasion of pri-
vacy.81 Despite admitting in court that he had sold the rights to the photographer, 
Dumas contested the strength of property rights compared to his right to privacy.82 
In a landmark decision, the Paris appeals court agreed with Dumas, holding, “that 
[Dumas] had a new kind of ‘right to privacy,’ which qualified the absolute claims of 
the law of property.”83 The court couched its decision in terms of dignity, reasoning 
                                                          
 71. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1165. 
 72. PETRUS C. SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING: DISCIPLINARY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR 
INMATES IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 66-77 (1984); see also Whitman supra note 24, at 1166-67 (explaining that “[i]f 
executed, high-status offenders were beheaded, while low-status offenders were hanged; if spared, high-status of-
fenders were housed in comfortable apartments, while low status offenders were subjected to degrading penal slav-
ery.”). 
 73. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1167. 
 74. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 10 (2003); See also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 613 (observing three decades after the French Revolution that “Everybody has remarked that in our time, 
and especially in France, this passion for equality is every day gaining ground in the human heart.”). 
 75. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 10 (2003). 
 76. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1166-67 (Whitman refers to this French legal phenomenon as “the revolution of 
leveling up.”). 
 77. Id. at 1175. 
 78. Id. 
 79. ANDRÉ MAUROIS, THE TITANS: A THREE-GENERATION BIOGRAPHY OF THE DUMAS 357 (Gerald Hopkins 
trans., 1957).  
 80. Id. at 358 (“Dumas committed the imprudence of allowing himself to be thus perpetuated, in his shirtsleeves, 
with his mistress, wearing a close-fitting jersey, perched on his knee. Yet another ‘picture’ shows her snuggling in his 
arms with her head pressed to his enormous chest.”). 
 81. Id. (noting that Dumas owed the photographer “a small sum of money,” and the photographer “thought that 
the loudly publicized sale of [the pictures] would compensate him for the unpaid bills.”); Whitman, supra note 38, at 
1176.  
 82. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1176. 
 83. Id. 
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that even though Dumas consented to the sale of the images, he retained the right to 
control his image.84 
The case involving Alexandre Dumas père is just one early courtroom triumph 
of personal privacy over property rights, but dignity has been inseparable from Eu-
ropean privacy law ever since.85 In France today, multiple legal sources protect dig-
nity through the right to privacy.86 First, the French Constitution expressly protects 
the right to privacy.87 Additionally, numerous national statutes address specific ap-
plications of the right.88 Of most historical significance to the E.U.’s right to be for-
gotten, however, is an international treaty: The European Convention on Human 
Rights.89 
The European Convention on Human Rights came into force in 1953, and ap-
plies to the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe, which includes the 
E.U., Russia, and Turkey, among others.90 Specifically, Article 8(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”91 Although the E.U. itself 
never overtly ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court of the 
E.U. recognizes it as consistent with the general principles of E.U. law.92 All E.U. 
member-states officially adopted the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
thus it applies to the E.U. as a whole.93 
B. The 1995 Data Protection Directive and Google Spain v. AEPD 
In 1995, the E.U. moved forward unilaterally in regard to online privacy by 
codifying a directive that includes the foundation for the right to be forgotten.94 The 
directive is formally titled the European Community Directive on Data Protection, and it lays 
out basic principles of privacy legislation to which E.U. member-states must con-
form.95 As is typical of many E.U. regulations, the directive provides very broad 
terms, but its application was initially narrow.96 The European Court of Justice finally 
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1193. 
 86. Pascal Mbongo,The French Privacy Law, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE LIGHT OF MEDIA CONVERGENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THREE COUNTRIES 125, 126 (Dieter Dörr & Russell L. Weaver eds. 2012). 
 87. Id. at 126 (noting “the right to privacy [was] elevated to the rank of constitutional right by a decision of July 
23, 1999 of the Constitutional Council.”). 
 88. Id. at 126. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Udo Fink, Protection of Privacy in the EU, Individual Rights and Legal Instruments, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN 
PRIVACY LAW: EMERGING CHALLENGES 75 (Norman Witzleb et. al. eds., 2014). 
 
 91. Id. at 76. 
 92. Id. at 75. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Council Directive, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 95/46/EC, art. 
12(b), 14(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281/31). 
 95. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA 38 (2008). 
 96. Rosen, supra note 36 (explaining that “Europeans have a long tradition of declaring abstract privacy rights in 
theory that they fail to enforce in practice.”). 
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enforced the directive’s broad terms in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (“Google Spain v. AEPD”).97 
Google Spain v. AEPD involved a claim by a Spanish national, Mario Costeja 
González (“Costeja”), against La Vanguardia—a daily newspaper—and against 
Google Spain and Google, Inc.98 Costeja sought the removal of links to two La Van-
guardia newspaper stories detailing a real-estate auction related to him and connected 
with the recovery of debts.99 Embarrassed of the circumstances of the auction, 
Costeja requested that La Vanguardia remove the pages containing his personal data, 
arguing that the passage of time had rendered the debt issue irrelevant and mislead-
ing.100 He also asked Google to expunge the links leading to the information.101 
When La Vanguardia and Google refused, Mr. Costeja went to Spain’s data protection 
agency (AEPD) for relief.102 
The AEPD, which is Spain’s local branch of a wider European system of online 
privacy regulators, ruled in favor of La Vanguardia but against Google.103 Google 
immediately appealed the order to the National High Court of Spain, which subse-
quently referred the issue to the European Court of Justice.104 The European Court 
of Justice “operates as a kind of Supreme Court” for the E.U.’s twenty-eight member 
states, and affirmed both decisions of the Spanish Data Protection Agency.105 As a 
result of the European Court of Justice’s directive, citizens of all twenty-eight E.U. 
nations have the right to demand that Google delink items that are “inadequate, ir-
relevant, or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
were processed and in the light of the time that has elapsed.”106 
It is unlikely that the right to be forgotten will remain within the E.U.’s bor-
ders.107 Strictly speaking, Google Spain v. AEPD only applies to Google’s European 
domains—such as Google.fr in France and Google.de in Germany—but 
Google.com, the company’s self-declared America site, is immune.108 Although the 
overwhelming majority of European Google searches are made to country-specific 
                                                          
 97. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google, Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=152065&doclng=en (May 13, 
2014). 
 98. Id.; Ravi Antani, Resistance of Memory: Could the European Union’s Right to be Forgotten Exist in the United States?, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173, 1175 (2015). 
 99. Id. 
 100. David Streitfeld, European Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/05/14/technology/google-should-erase-web-links-to-some-personal-data-europes-highest-court-
says.html?_r=0. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Toobin, supra note 15. 
 104. Streitfeld, supra note 100.  
 105. Toobin, supra note 15.  
 106. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google, Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja 
González, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=152065&doclang=en. 
 107. Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/08/06/technology/personaltech/right-to-be-forgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html. 
 108. Id.  
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domains, Google.com is still accessible anywhere in Europe, and regulators are wast-
ing no time in closing that loophole.109 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger described the cur-
rent enforcement conundrum as a “speed bump,” explaining further that “if you 
quickly search on Google.de, you’ll not find the links that have been removed . . . But 
if you spend the extra ten seconds to go to Google.com you find them.”110 
C. The Article 29 Working Party and France’s CNIL 
In November of 2014, just six months after Google Spain v. AEPD, an E.U. 
regulatory body consisting of national privacy regulators from each member state 
issued guidelines expanding the scope of the right to be forgotten by demanding that 
Google apply the ruling “to Google’s entire search empire,” including its American 
site.111 In a statement accompanying the guidelines, the regulatory body—known as 
the Article 29 Working Party—stated: “Under E.U. law, everyone has a right to data 
protection . . . Decisions must be implemented in such a way that they guarantee the 
effective and complete protection of data subjects’ rights and that E.U. law cannot 
be circumvented.”112 
Effective online privacy protection in Europe requires that Google in particular 
comply with the guidelines worldwide, since the company accounts for nearly eighty-
five percent of Europe’s online search market.113 Although it was initially unclear 
how the Article 29 Working Party intended to enforce the guidelines, it was immedi-
ately clear that E.U. nations would continue to fight for the global adoption of the 
right to be forgotten.114 Pursuant to the authority provided by Google Spain v. AEPD 
and the Article 29 Working Party guidelines, the French data protection authority 
acted first to enforce the right to be forgotten throughout all Google domains.115 On 
May 21, 2015, the French authority, known as the Commission Nationale de l’in-
formatique et des Libertés (CNIL), notified Google that compliance with E.U. law 
required the blanket removal of approved requests.116 The CNIL rejected Google’s 
argument that Google.com was immune to E.U. regulation as a separate, non-Euro-
pean entity, reasoning that all Google domains constitute a single processing.117 
                                                          
 109. Id.  
 110. Toobin, supra note 15 (Viktor Mayer-Schönberger is in favor of the speed bump approach, reasoning that it 
“gives people a chance to grow and get beyond these instances in their pasts.”). 
 111. Mark Scott, ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Should Apply Worldwide, E.U. Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/technology/right-to-be-forgotten-should-be-extended-beyond-europe-eu-
panel-says.html?_r=0. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (noting that “regulators did not clarify whether the guidelines would apply only to requests made by resi-
dents of the European Union” or “how the ruling could be enforced beyond the 28-member European Union . . .”). 
 115. Carol A.F. Umhoefer, Right to be Forgotten: New Enforcement Trends and Perspectives, PRIVACY MATTERS – DLA 
PIPER BLOG (Aug. 4, 2015), http://blogs.dlapiper.com/privacymatters/right-to-be-forgotten-new-enforcement -
trends-and-perspectives-2/. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. (CNIL stated that, “the service provided by the company via its search engine ‘Google search’ constitutes 
a single processing. Indeed, the different domain names that the company chose to implement to facilitate the local 
use of its service are only means of access to this process.”). 
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CNIL President Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin announced the decision and gave Google 
fifteen days to comply with the de-indexing request.118 
Country-specific privacy regulators, as opposed to the Article 29 Working Party, 
have the teeth to accomplish compliance.119 For example, the CNIL has the authority 
to issue financial administrative sanctions and, under the French Criminal Code, 
could subject Google to a fine of up to €1,500,000 for each case of noncompliance.120 
In July of 2015, Google filed an unsuccessful informal appeal with the CNIL.121 The 
French regulatory body again refuted a Google argument against the right to be for-
gotten removals, asserting that it was not applying French law extraterritorially, rather 
“[i]t simply requests full observance of European legislation by non-European players 
offering their services in Europe.”122 French legal experts were in unanimous agree-
ment that the CNIL demand was lawful because the 1995 Data Protection Directive 
lacks territorial restrictions.123 The CNIL order is unappealable under French law.124 
D. The General Data Protection Regulation 
The European Commission proposed a new framework for online data privacy 
in 2012, making clear its intention to strengthen the 1995 Data Protection Di-
rective.125 The framework is titled the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which itself includes in Article 17 the official codification of the right to be forgot-
ten.126 The right to be forgotten—the most controversial proposal by any measure—
was described by the European Commission as “the right of individuals to have their 
data no longer processed and deleted when they are no longer needed for legitimate 
purposes.”127 Viviane Reding, European Commissioner for Information, Society, 
and Media at the time of the proposal, insisted that the right to be forgotten already 
existed, and the proposal was merely illuminating current law.128 Regardless of the 
authenticity of Commissioner Reding’s position, Article 17 of the GDPR is a signifi-
cant expansion of the reach and strength of the law on which the European Court of 
                                                          
 118. Id.  
 119. Scott, supra note 111 (“For now, the [Article 29 Working Party’s] decision to expand the scope of the’right to 
be forgotten’ is mostly just for show. The guidelines are not binding, and it will be up to E.U. member countries to 
decide how to apply them—or if they want to apply them at all.”). 
 120. Umhoefer, supra note 115. 
 121. CNIL, Right to Delisting: Google Informal Appeal Rejected (Sep. 21, 2015), available at http://www.cnil.fr/eng-
lish/news-and-events/news/article/right-to-delisting-google-informal-appeal-rejected/. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Manjoo, supra note 107. 
 124. Samuel Gibbs, French Data Regulator Rejects Google’s Right-To-Be-Forgotten Appeal, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 21, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/french-google-right-to-be-forgotten-appeal. 
 125. Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World: A European Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century, COM (2012) 9 
final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
 126. David Lindsay, The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in European Data Protection Law, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN 
PRIVACY LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 290, 291 (Norman Witzleb et. al. eds., 2014). 
 127. Id.; see also A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, COM (2010) 609 final 
(Nov. 4, 2010). 
 128. Lindsay, supra note 126, at 311; But see Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, Mario Costeja González (C-131/12), Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen (June 25, 2013) (stating that the 
GDPR “does not purport to represent a codification of existing law, but an important legal innovation.”). 
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Justice, the Article 29 Working Party, and the CNIL relied in enforcing the right to 
be forgotten.129 
Under the proposed GDPR, “jurisdiction will reach outside the EU, with ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction tied to the offering of goods or services to, or the monitoring 
of, data subjects in the EU.”130 The proposal also establishes the European Data 
Protection Board, which will serve as the law’s primary interpretive body.131 Clearly 
defined boundaries will guide the application of the right to be forgotten, and fines 
of either two percent global profit or €1,000,000—whichever is higher—are available 
for violations.132 According to Marcus Evans, a partner at the London offices of 
Norton Rose Fulbright, “[m]ost businesses will need to make some changes . . . [and] 
[m]any will have to make extensive changes” to bring their data processing into com-
pliance with the GDPR.133 Once the E.U.’s three primary governmental bodies agree 
on the regulation’s precise language—and all indications are that they will—the 
GDPR will go into force following a two-year period.134 
III. PROLIFERATION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN – THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE 
Aside from the strengthening of the E.U.’s right to be forgotten, companies 
such as Google should be concerned about the proliferation of similar but slightly 
different laws around the globe; and this is already occurring in the Western Hemi-
sphere.135 According to Graham Greenleaf, a Professor of Law and Information Sys-
tems at the University of New South Wales, “[n]early one hundred jurisdictions have 
enacted data privacy laws, almost half of them being outside of Europe.”136 These 
enactments are largely in response to the E.U.’s highly consequential practice of de-
termining the adequacy of other countries’ data protection mechanisms.137 If the Eu-
ropean Commission concludes that a country’s data privacy protections are inade-
quate, it has the authority to prohibit data transfers to that country.138 
                                                          
 129. See generally Marcus Evans, European Council Approves EU General Data Protection Regulation Draft; Final Approval 
May Come by End of 2015, DATA PROTECTION REPORT BLOG (June 15, 2015), http://www.dataprotectionre-
port.com/2015/06/european-council-approves-eu-general-data-protection-regulation-draft-final-approval-may-
come-by-end-of-2015/. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (referring to the European Data Protection Board as “a reincarnation of the Article 29 Working Party.”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Evans, supra note 129. 
 135. Manjoo, supra note 107 (“Since Europe’s decision last year, several countries in Latin America and Asia have 
pushed for their own delinking rules, and some of these may elide the protections for free speech outlined in Europe’s 
version of the law. A more troubling prospect for search engines is the potential for the new laws to be applied 
beyond local jurisdictions.”). 
 136. Graham Greenleaf, A World Data Privacy Treaty? ‘Globalisation’ and ‘Modernisation’ of Council of Europe Convention 
108, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 92, 93 (Norman Witzleb et. al. 
eds., 2014). 
 137. European Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016). 
 138. DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 1 (2005). 
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A. Argentina 
Since the European Court of Justice’s ruling in Google Spain v. AEPD, countries 
outside of the E.U. have begun pushing for similar online privacy protections.139 
Argentina, as the first Latin American country to obtain the EU’s adequacy finding, 
is a logical starting point.140 Argentine notions of privacy are similar to those in Eu-
rope; they are historically rooted and protected by law.141 In the first half of the 
twentieth century, revered Argentinian author Jorge Francisco Isidoro Luis Borges 
abstractly captured Argentine attitudes toward privacy, the past, and the value of for-
getting.142 The protagonist of one of Borges’ most well-known stories—Ireno 
Funes—is cursed with the inability to forget.143 Writing on Argentina’s right to be 
forgotten, Professor Edward L. Carter, Associate Professor of Communications at 
Brigham Young University, explains that “[f]or Funes, the present was worthless be-
cause it was consumed by his memories of the past.”144 Although the story’s relation 
to Argentina’s right to be forgotten may seem attenuated, Professor Carter notes that 
“[t]he struggle between remembering and forgetting . . . has manifested itself in Ar-
gentina in poignant ways . . . [and] has played out in Argentina’s courts in the form 
of lawsuits by celebrities against the Internet search engines Google and Yahoo.”145 
Argentina regulates online privacy rights under the Personal Data Protection 
Act of 2000, which closely mirrors Europe’s Data Protection Directive of 1995.146 
Like Europe, Argentina justifies the law in terms of dignity, its stated purpose being 
“the comprehensive protection of personal information . . . in order to guarantee the 
right of individuals to their honor and privacy.”147 Argentina’s law is even more ex-
pansive than Europe’s Data Protection Directive, however, defining “personal data” 
as the information of entities as well as individuals.148 Recent applications of the law 
also suggest that its protections may extend to celebrities, athletes, and even govern-
ment officials.149 In 2007, an Argentine court granted a temporary restraining order 
                                                          
 139. Manjoo, supra note 107. 
 140. Heisenberg, supra note 138, at 104. 
 141. Edward L. Carter, Argentina’s Right to be Forgotten, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 23, 31-32 (2013). 
 142. JORGE LUIS BORGES, Funes, the Memorious, in FICCIONES (Anthony Kerrigan ed. & trans., 1962); Edward L. 
Carter acknowledges that commentators have credited Borges with “presaging the Internet,” JORGE LUIS BORGES, 
The Garden of Forking Paths, in FICCIONES 89, 100 (“He believed in an infinite series of times, in a dizzily growing, ever 
spreading network of diverging, converging, and parallel times. This web of time . . . embraces every possibility.” (em-
phasis in original)). 
 143. JORGE LUIS BORGES, Funes, the Memorious, in FICCIONES 107, 112-15 (Anthony Kerrigan ed. & trans., 1962) 
(similar to the Internet, “Funes not only remembered every leaf on every tree of every wood, but even every one of 
the times he had perceived or imagined it.” The narrator concludes the story: “It occurred to me that each one of my 
words (each one of my gestures) would live on in [Funes’] implacable memory; I was benumbed by the fear of 
multiplying superfluous gestures.”). 
 144. Carter, supra note 141, at 23. 
 145. Id. 
 146. JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE WAR ON PRIVACY 130 (2007). 
 147. Personal Data Protection Act, Law No. 25, 326 (Oct. 4, 2000) (emphasis added), available at http://www.pro-
tecciondedatos.com.ar/law25326.htm. 
 148. Klosek, supra note 146. 
 149. Uki Goni, Can A Soccer Star Block Google Searches?, TIME (Nov. 14, 2008), http://con-
tent.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,18593239,00.html. 
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against Google and Yahoo, forcing the companies to delist results of plaintiffs evok-
ing their rights under the Personal Data Protection Act of 2000.150 One such plaintiff 
was Diego Maradona, the Argentinian soccer star turned coach.151 Even Argentinian 
judges have become litigants by filing their own suits against search engines pursuant 
to the right to be forgotten.152 
The case of Argentinian entertainer Virginia da Cunha is the strongest indicator 
that courts in Argentina are willing to enforce the right to be forgotten.153 Da Cunha, 
along with the previously mentioned plaintiffs, asserted her right to be forgotten 
against Google and Yahoo, alleging specifically that results from the search engines 
“linked to . . . websites offering sexual content, pornography, escorts, and other ac-
tivities related to sex trafficking.”154 On July 29, 2009, Judge Virginia Simari ruled in 
her favor, reasoning that da Cunha had the “right to control her own image in the 
present time.”155 Google and Yahoo were ordered to remove the links and images, 
and to pay 50,000 pesos each for moral damages.156 The right to be forgotten thus 
prevailed despite multiple provisions in the Argentine Constitution protecting 
speech, expression, and the press; and despite Judge Simari’s acknowledgment that 
the prevailing right “was not a right explicitly protected in the Constitution of Argen-
tina.”157 
On appeal, a divided three-judge panel partially overturned the lower court.158 
The appeals court held that no damages were due da Cunha, reasoning that search 
engines can be held liable only if they were notified of clearly illegal content and were 
negligent in failing to remove it.159 Although the court revoked money damages, it 
upheld the lower court’s order that the search engines remove the da Cunha links.160 
However, the appeals court’s decision is inconclusive for a few reasons.161 First, the 
appeals court was split and offered no guidance on the specific da Cunha-related links 
Google and Yahoo were required to remove.162 Second, the court did not elaborate 
                                                          
 150. Stephanie Condon, Argentine Judge: Google, Yahoo Must Censor Searches, CNET (Nov. 12, 2008, 9:20 AM PST), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/argentine-judge-google-yahoo-must-censor-searches/. 
 151. Goni, supra note 149 (although Maradona is considered one of the greatest soccer players in history, he would 
like some of his past to be forgotten: “he was banned from [a] professional game in Italy in 1991 for cocaine use, 
and he tested positive for drugs at the 1994 World Cup tournament.”). 
 152. Id. (suggesting the Argentine law is far too expansive: “the litigants also include three important judicial fig-
ures, among them high-profile judge Maria Servini de Cubria . . .”) 
 153. Carter, supra note 141, at 24-25. 
 154. Id. at 26 
 155. Id. at 28 
 156. Id. (noting that “moral damages” were assessed even though “[t]he judge concluded that no material damage 
had occurred . . .”). 
 157. Id. at 27 
 158. Vinod Sreeharsha, No Safe Harbors in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://bits.blogs.ny-
times.com/2010/08/20/no-safe-harbors-in-argentina/?_r=0. 
 159. Eduardo Bertoni & Elizabeth Compa, Emerging Patterns in Internet Freedom of Expression: Comparative Research 
Findings in Argentina and Abroad, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS EN LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN Y ACCESSO A LA 
INFORMATION [CELE] (Document prepared for the Latin American Regional Meeting on Freedom of Expression 
and the Internet, Buenos Aires, Argentine, Oct. 19, 2010). 
 160. Search Engines Not Responsible for Content, BUENOS AIRES HERALD (Sep. 5, 2013), http://www.buenosai-
resherald.com/article/139989/. 
 161. See infra notes 162-64. 
 162. See Carter, supra note 141, at 28-31 (this lack of guidance from the court of appeals is illustrated by the fact 
that as of May 2013, “Yahoo Argentina has still blocked all searches related to Da Cunha, although Google Argentina 
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as to what constitutes notice, or at what point search engines are “made aware” and 
thus liable for the negligent failure to remove links.163 Finally, Judge Ana María R. 
Brillo de Serrat—who joined in the majority position—”spent most of her brief opin-
ion defending the idea that individuals should have a right to be forgotten.”164 
B. The Rest of the Western Hemisphere 
Argentina, as the first country to obtain an adequacy finding from the E.U., 
receives the most international attention regarding privacy legislation.165 Chile ad-
dressed data privacy before Argentina, however, and has regulated the area pursuant 
to the Law for the Protection of Private Life since 1999.166 The Chilean law sets forth 
guidelines for “the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information . . . [and] 
provides individuals with the right to access and correct their personal infor-
mation.”167 Brazil on the other hand has weak privacy laws in comparison to both 
Argentina and Chile.168 According to some estimates, Google faces upwards of six 
hundred Brazilian lawsuits because of Brazil’s lack of data privacy legislation.169 De-
spite rampant litigation, efforts to legislate regarding online data privacy in Brazil have 
been met with fierce opposition.170 
Canada began debating online privacy legislation in 1998 in anticipation of the 
E.U.’s Data Protection Directive entering into force.171 The primary catalyst to Can-
ada’s swift action was the general public, eighty-one percent of which felt it was time 
to overhaul privacy laws that were inadequate in light of the Internet172 On April 13, 
2000, the Canadian government passed The Canadian Personal Information Protec-
tion and Electronic Documents Act, which the European Commission deemed ade-
quate.173 
The key point is that the countries that did implement online privacy regulations 
did so largely if not exclusively in response to the 1995 European Data Protection 
Directive, and the international reaction is unlikely to be any different following the 
implementation of the GDPR.174 Online privacy is not a passing trend, and the E.U.’s 
                                                          
has not.” 
 163. Bertoni & Compa, supra note 159 (“Despite the implications this finding holds for future litigation, the Court 
did not further elaborate on how or when the search engines could be considered having been made aware nor on 
what exactly constitutes ‘proper [advisory] mechanisms.’”).  
 164. Carter, supra note 141 at 30 (Judge Ann María R. Brilla de Serrat cited and discussed Viktor Mayer-Schön-
berger extensively in her opinion).  
 165. Klosek, supra note 146 at 130. 
 166. Id. at 130-31 
 167. Id. at 131. 
 168. Id. at 130; See also Vinod Sreeharsha, No Safe Harbors in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010, 6:40 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/no-safe-harbors-in-argentina/?_r=0. 
 169. Sreeharsha, supra note 158 (“Marcel Leonardi, a Brazilian professor of Internet law at Fundação Getulio 
Vargas-Sao Paolo estimates that Google currently faces at lease 600 lawsuits in Brazil.”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Heisenberg, supra note 138, at 103 (debate began “three weeks before the entry into force of the European 
Data Protection Directive.” 
 172. Heisenberg, supra note 138, at 103 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 120-21 (Heisenberg refers to the European Data Protection Directive as the “catalyst for most, if not 
all, of the privacy legislation” enacted by other countries. She continues that the “impetus for the spate of data 
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quick reaction to it has made it “the most influential voice in global privacy regulation, 
in part because it seems to care the most.”175 The United States on the other hand 
has “remained an outlier by not having comprehensive privacy legislation.”176 
IV. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
Jennifer Granick, the director of civil liberties at the Center for Internet and 
Society at Stanford Law School, recently wrote that “[p]rivacy’s obituary has been 
written many, many times, but the patient lingers on.”177 Michael Rogers Rubin, writ-
ing about American privacy law nearly thirty years earlier, expressed a similar view.178 
He posited that “[i]n our nation’s history, three great waves of technological and so-
cial change have forced major revisions to our laws in order to ensure the continued 
protection of personal privacy”: the American Revolution; yellow journalism at the 
turn of the century; and the practice of electronic eavesdropping.179 The fourth wave, 
which Rubin accurately predicted, is the computer age.180 
A. The Founding Fathers’ Privacy 
Privacy was certainly a point of emphasis to the Founding Fathers in the devel-
opment of early American law, but the texts from the era are tame, narrow, and in-
adequate to address privacy concerns today.181 The public was outraged at British 
use of general writs of assistance, which provided British officers unfettered access 
to any location they wished to search.182 In response to the writs of assistance and to 
the British practice of quartering soldiers in American homes, the Founding Fathers 
created the Third and Fourth Amendments.183 It is notable that despite the concern 
for personal privacy rights during the drafting of our nation’s founding documents, 
the word ‘privacy’ is absent from the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, 
and the Bill of Rights.184 However, the intent of the founding fathers, and the context 
of the times in which they created the documents, must be considered.185 The pri-
                                                          
protection laws that emerged in the 1998 – 2004 time frame was the European initiative.” In her view, the European 
Union unilaterally “created an international data protection regime,” without consulting or negotiating with any other 
nations, most notably the United States.). 
 175. Tim Wu, The International Privacy Regime, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 91, 104 (Anupam 
Chander, Lauren Gelman, Margaret Jane Radin eds., 2008).  
 176. Heisenberg, supra note 138, at 120. 
 177. Jennifer Granick, Data and Protecting the Right to Privacy, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY BLOG 
(Sep. 29, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/09/data-and-protecting-right-privacy. 
 178. See MICHAEL ROGERS RUBIN, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC WRONGS: THE COMPUTER AND PERSONAL 
PRIVACY 7 ff. (1988). 
 179. MICHAEL ROGERS RUBIN, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC WRONGS: THE COMPUTER AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 
7-9 (1988). 
 180. Id. at 133. 
 181. FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY 15-17 (2009). 
 182. Rubin, supra note 179, at 9-10 (noting “Independence was fought for and won partly to put in place protec-
tions for the individual against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 183. U.S. CONST. amends III, IV. 
 184. Lane, supra note 181, at 15 (the word privacy is similarly absent from all seventeen amendments subsequently 
added to the Constitution). 
 185. Rubin, supra note 179, at 10-11 (explaining that “[t]he absence of a declaration of human rights [to address 
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mary author of the Declaration of Independence—Thomas Jefferson—listed griev-
ances against the Crown, including violations of American independence and auton-
omy.186 As explained by author and attorney Frederick Lane, “[i]ndependence and 
autonomy are central components of the concept of privacy, and although Jeffer-
son . . . may have eschewed the word itself, there is little question that [the Founders] 
were motivated in large part by the belief that the British Crown was illegally infring-
ing on their private affairs.”187 
B. Justice Louis Brandeis: The Right to Privacy and the Olmstead Dissent 
The contemporary right to privacy in America arose from a revered law review 
article—The Right to Privacy—by Samuel Warren and eventual Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis.188 Warren and Brandeis were the first to assert that privacy should 
stand alone, independent from other recognized rights.189 The article, written in re-
sponse to the Saturday Evening Gazette’s harassing stories toward Samuel Warren’s elite 
family, and in particular his wife and daughter, has “the unique distinction of having 
synthesized at one stroke a whole new category of legal rights and of having initiated 
a new field of jurisprudence.”190 In 1960, recounting how the article came to be, 
Professor William Prosser explained that the conflict culminated “when the newspa-
pers had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of a daughter and Mr. Warren 
became annoyed . . . It was an annoyance for which the press, the advertisers and the 
entertainment industry of America were to pay dearly over the next seventy years.”191 
Aside from their immediate motivation in writing the article, Brandeis and War-
ren were concerned about the invention of a camera that could capture images with-
out requiring a long, sustained pose.192 The authors feared the repercussions of a 
device that could capture pictures with such ease, lamenting that “[i]nstantaneous 
photographs . . . and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the pre-
diction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.’”193 In other words, individuals should have control of their personality and 
public image, and the law should protect such control by preventing the nonconsen-
sual exposure of either.194 Borrowing a phrase by Judge Thomas Cooley, and increas-
                                                          
general writs of assistance] should not be mistaken as a lack of interest in these topics on the part of the Constitutional 
framers. Rather, the omission is but one aspect of the cultural perspective of two centuries past.”). 
 186. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 ff. (U.S. 1776). 
 187. Lane, supra note 181, at 16.  
 188. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.   
 189. RICHARD F. HIXSON, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 29 (1987) (explaining that the article by Warren and Brandeis 
“propounded the concept [of privacy] as independent from the rights of property, contract, and trust.”).   
 190. SAMUEL HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 17 (1964) (citing XLI AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE, 926).  
 191. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL L. REV. 383, 383 (1960). 
 192. Granick, supra note 177.  
 193. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195.  
 194. MICHAEL F. MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY 2 (1972) (noting that Warren and Brandeis’ right to privacy “was 
aimed at counteracting exploitation and exposure of the personality.”). 
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ing its popularity immeasurably, Brandeis and Warren declared that in order to pro-
tect individuals from unwanted exposure or exploitation, a “right to be let alone” was 
required.195 
Privacy existed as an elusive concept during the infancy of the United States, 
but Warren and Brandeis gathered its scattered pieces and molded them into an in-
telligible right.196 By the time they published the article, Warren had discontinued his 
legal practice to devote his full attention to an inherited family paper business, and 
Brandeis was a young lawyer destined for the Supreme Court.197 Although Brandeis’ 
position on privacy was not realized during his illustrious career, “[t]he seed planted 
by Warren and Brandeis has borne fruit in numerous decisions of courts of high 
repute affirming a right to privacy.”198 
As a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis’ first significant stand in 
support of privacy rights was his dissent in Olmstead v. United States.199 In Olmstead, 
the Court considered whether evidence of private telephone conversations, obtained 
through wire-tapping, was admissible against a criminal defendant.200 Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft, writing for a 5-4 majority, declared that wire-tapping did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because there was neither a physical search nor a 
seizure, only evidence obtained by ear.201 Although Olmstead involved an alleged in-
vasion of privacy by the government, Justice Brandeis’ dissent addressed privacy 
more broadly and is still applicable to encroachments on privacy rights—even online 
privacy rights—nearly a century later.202 The arguments Justice Brandeis advanced in 
his dissent mirror those introduced in The Right to Privacy, and the focus of the latter 
was clearly personal—not governmental—invasions of privacy.203 
After reciting the facts of the case, Justice Brandeis referenced Chief Justice 
Marshall’s famous line in McCulloch v. Maryland, declaring: “We must never forget that 
it is a Constitution that we are expounding.”204 By this reference he sought to impress 
upon his colleagues, the government, and the general public, his firm belief in the 
ability of the Constitution to address and resolve modern problems unknown at the 
time of its drafting.205 He offered as an example the Fourth Amendment—crucial to 
the determination in Olmstead—which when adopted provided individuals security 
                                                          
 195. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195. 
 196. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 5 (2008). 
 197. Prosser, supra note 191.  
 198. SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 19 (1964). 
 199. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 200. Id. at 455. 
 201. Id. at 464. 
 202. Compare Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (stating that the “well-known historical purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers, and his 
effects, and to prevent their seizure against his will.”) (emphasis added), with Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope . . . 
[the Founding Fathers] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions.”). 
 203. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 348 (1967).  
 204. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
 205. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Justice Brandeis emphasized that this was not a novel 
concept: “Since [McCulloch v. Maryland] this court has repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, 
under various clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the fathers could not have dreamed.”). 
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“in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” by protecting against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.206 Threats to privacy existing when the states ratified the Con-
stitution in 1788, Brandeis reasoned, “had been necessarily simple,” and thus the 
Fourth Amendment was necessarily simple.207 At the time of the Constitution’s en-
actment, information was improperly obtained through tactics such as breaking and 
entering, theft, torture, and forced testimony.208 However, “[t]ime works changes, 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principal to be vital 
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”209 
Nearly forty years after Olmstead, and over a quarter century after Justice 
Brandeis’ death, the Court revisited the issue of government wiretapping.210 In the 
1967 case of Katz v. United States, the issue was almost identical to that in Olmstead.211 
In a narrow opinion overruling Olmstead, the Supreme Court adopted Justice 
Brandeis’ view and his dissent virtually became law.212 As a result, under the Fourth 
Amendment, individuals now have a right to privacy against government intrusion 
where there is “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . [and] the expectation 
[is] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”213 
C. American Privacy Through the Twentieth Century 
Katz illuminates Professor Whitman’s theory that the American understanding 
of privacy is tied tightly to liberty, and specifically to freedom from government over-
reach.214 It must be acknowledged, however, that Supreme Court decisions regarding 
privacy are not confined to Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues.215 For 
example, in 1958 in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court recognized the right to associa-
tional privacy under the First Amendment.216 In unanimously striking down an Ala-
bama law requiring the NAACP to share a list of all members and officers, the Court 
explained that the First Amendment’s freedom of association required a right to pri-
vacy in such associations, and thus a new constitutionally protected privacy right 
emerged.217 
Similarly in 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court created a new 
privacy right by utilizing the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.218 
                                                          
 206. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 207. Olmstead 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)  
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 213. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. Dissenting).  
 214. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1161.  
 215. Id. at 1214. 
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Griswold considered and invalidated a Connecticut law barring the use of contracep-
tives and the practice of medical professionals assisting anyone in acquiring contra-
ceptives.219 The Court recognized that reproductive autonomy in a marriage is “a 
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . .”220 It stated bluntly that the “[v]ari-
ous guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.”221 Seven years after 
Griswold, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court applied its reasoning to unmarried people, 
further expanding the right of privacy in intimate relations.222 These decisions repre-
sent “a shift in logic,” which “provided the doctrinal basis for the Court’s subsequent 
decision to protect women’s reproductive freedom in Roe v. Wade, and its decision 
striking down a Texas antisodomy statute in Lawrence v. Texas.”223 In each instance 
the Court recognized that the newly created privacy rights were fundamental rights, 
and although not absolute, they required and still receive the highest level of protec-
tion under the law.224 These cases and others, known as the constitutional privacy 
decisions, clearly evince at some level the Court’s recognition of an implied right to 
privacy.225 The presence of government involvement in cases finding an invasion of 
privacy, however, is a glaring common denominator that supports the proposition 
that American privacy is understood as liberty from government.226 
To emphasize the American view of privacy as a form of liberty from govern-
ment, Professor Whitman juxtaposes two Supreme Court cases.227 In Florida Star v. 
J.B.F., the plaintiff—a rape victim—sued a local newspaper that identified her by 
name in an article.228 She sought damages pursuant to a state statute prohibiting 
newspapers and similar entities from identifying a victim of a sexual offense by 
name.229 In Hanlon v. Berger, a couple claimed a violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights where officials from the Fish and Wildlife Service executed a valid search war-
rant, accompanied by a CNN news crew.230 In weighing the First Amendment’s pro-
tection of the free press against the plaintiffs’ privacy rights, the Court handed down 
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 220. Id. at 486. 
 221. Id. at 484. 
 222. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 223. AUSTIN SARAT, LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, AND MARTHA MERRILL UMPHREY, IMAGINING NEW LEGALITIES: 
PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2012). 
 224. See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“We thus reach petitioner’s claim 
that the production order in the state litigation trespasses upon fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“The present case, 
then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees.”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. . .”). 
 225. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1214.  
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 227. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1215. 
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20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 23
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss2/23
 2017] AN AMERICAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 331 
seemingly inconsistent decisions.231 In Florida Star the rape victim’s privacy claim was 
trumped by the First Amendment’s protection of the free press.232 In Hanlon, how-
ever, the Court found a violation of the plaintiffs’ privacy rights despite the First 
Amendment.233 The inconsistency is explained by the presence of law enforcement 
in Hanlon, and the lack thereof in Florida Star.234 According to Professor Whitman, 
“[o]nce the police come into it, American intuitions shift . . . You can count on Amer-
icans to see privacy violations once the state gets into the act.”235 
For representative democracy in the United States to function, it is essential 
that the views of the people are reflected in the government’s policies; and although 
judicial interpretation of public policies may lag behind public sentiment, it is equally 
essential that it catch up.236 Privacy rights in the United States expand and contract 
over time in reaction to the realities of the day and the views of the people.237 As has 
been shown, the Court has created constitutional rights to privacy in addressing issues 
emerging throughout the latter half of the twentieth century; issues that could not be 
foreseen by the Founding Fathers.238 The Internet—like modern contraceptives and 
reproductive sciences—could not have been foreseen.239 
The Supreme Court has not yet recognized a right to information privacy, but 
there is reason to believe that it can—and will—do so.240 In 1977, the Court stated 
in dicta that it was “not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation 
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks . . . much of 
which is potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.”241 Later, in a case consid-
ering the newsworthiness of the Nixon Tapes, the Court disallowed the press access 
beyond that afforded the general public, reasoning that such access could be used for 
“improper purposes,” such as to “gratify private spite or promote public scandal.”242 
One year later, in a case considering the Freedom of Information Act, the Court 
employed language that could encompass a right to be forgotten, noting the “vast 
difference” between information available from a “diligent search” of files and ar-
chives, and a “computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of infor-
mation.”243 There the Court found an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and 
“recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information 
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 232. Florida Star, 526 U.S. at 532 
 233. Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 809-10 (although the Court also held that petitioners were entitled to the defense of 
qualified immunity). 
 234. Whitman, supra note 38, at 1215. 
 235. Id. 
 236. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 42 
(1995). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Supra notes 216-25. 
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even where the information may have been at one time public.”244 As recently as 
2011, the Court “assume[d], without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy 
right.”245 Justice Scalia concurred in that opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, but as-
serted his belief that the “right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist.”246 
Justice Scalia’s death in February of 2016, like that of any Supreme Court Jus-
tice, will change the composition of the Court, and could provide the conditions nec-
essary for the recognition of an American right to be forgotten.247 Joseph Thai, the 
Watson Centennial Chair in Law and Presidential Professor at the University of Ok-
lahoma College of Law, recently wrote that it “is clear today that the theory of con-
stitutional interpretation that Justice Scalia championed—originalism—is just one 
justice away from extinction on the Supreme Court.”248 It is by this originalist inter-
pretation that Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, declared, “‘informational pri-
vacy’ does not exist.”249 Even the most conservative of the eight remaining justices 
on the Court are more forward-looking and flatly reject originalism.250 
Justice Scalia’s seat remains vacant even as we approach the one-year anniver-
sary of his death and the inauguration of a new President.251 The myriad factors at 
play in discussing Scalia’s replacement deserve more attention than this Note can 
provide. 
Nevertheless, a growing embrace of foreign law is replacing the departure of 
originalism from the Court.252 The history of the Court is replete with support 
from—and in some cases reliance on—foreign law.253 The United States today, how-
ever, is confronted with more challenges that are global in nature than ever before.254 
Justice Stephen Breyer argues that meeting these challenges “requires information 
and understanding that often lie outside our borders.”255 Addressing privacy online 
through a right to be forgotten, tailored to the traditions of the United States and 
consistent with the Constitution, would show that the Founding Fathers’ great ex-
periment is still viable, and that our government is still able to solve the world’s 
emerging problems. Justice Breyer has not addressed the right to be forgotten but his 
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words certainly apply: “[T]he world will follow someone’s example if not ours. Failing 
to lend our voices, we may find ourselves not so well served by, or happy with, the 
results.”256 
D. The Twenty-First Century 
The United States is changing dramatically.257 The three largest corporations in 
the world by equity value as of 2015 are Apple, Google, and Microsoft—all American 
technology companies.258 Facebook, another well-known American company which 
ranked twelfth worldwide by equity value, boasts nearly 1.6 billion users, or half of 
all Internet users worldwide.259 The booming Internet industry is no longer confined 
to desktop computers; instead, people are now able to literally wear the Internet with 
products such as Google Glass and Apple Watch.260 This trend suggests the contin-
ued development of devices posing threats to individual online privacy rights.261 
American public opinion, unlike the law, is keeping pace with the aforemen-
tioned technological innovations.262 A 2013 Pew Research Center study revealed that 
sixty-eight percent of American Internet users “believe current laws are not good 
enough in protecting people’s privacy online . . . .”263 Further, a 2014 study by Soft-
ware Advice surveyed five hundred American adults and found that “[a] solid major-
ity—61 percent—were in favor of a ‘right to be forgotten’ law for U.S. citizens.”264 
Despite public opinion, American tech companies have pushed against the adoption 
of any form of a right to be forgotten, and, reinforced by well-founded criticism from 
American legal and technological scholars, have thus far succeeded.265 
V. ACKNOWLEDGING CRITICISM OF AN AMERICAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
In 2013, Google paid D.C. lobbyists $15.8 million to influence legislation.266 
While Silicon Valley corporations are certainly opposed to an American right to be 
forgotten, a more significant obstacle to its adoption is the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.267 The First Amendment establishes in relevant part that 
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“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . . .”268 
A. Legal Opposition 
Dawinder Sidhu, a professor at the University of New Mexico School of Law, 
is among the voices arguing that the right to be forgotten is incompatible with the 
First Amendment.269 Professor Sidhu points out that even Louis Brandeis and Sam-
uel Warren distinguished between private and public information in The Right to Pri-
vacy.270 The European right to be forgotten, on the other hand, provides individuals 
a privacy interest in their personal information even where the individual is solely 
responsible for exposing that information to the Internet.271 The right to be forgot-
ten as adopted in Europe is unchecked by competing rights that exist in the United 
States, and thus, it is argued, is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.272 
Jeffrey Rosen has written extensively on privacy in the United States, and alt-
hough he generally supports it, he is adamantly opposed to the right to be forgot-
ten.273 He echoes First Amendment arguments, pointing to a lawsuit filed against 
Wikipedia by two Germans convicted of murder.274 The German plaintiffs sought 
the removal from Wikipedia of their criminal histories, which is allowed under Ger-
man law but is far more complicated in America where the First Amendment protects 
the publication of criminal history, with some state-imposed exceptions.275 He addi-
tionally argues that monetary sanctions for noncompliance would have “a serious 
chilling effect” on free speech and the free press.276 
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, while not specifically addressing the right to be forgotten, believes that the 
right to privacy is more fairly characterized as a right to misrepresent.277 Like many 
legal issues, Judge Posner views privacy through an economic lens.278 He reasons 
that the law does not allow sellers to misrepresent their goods, and since people sell 
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themselves on a regular basis, personal misrepresentations should be similarly disal-
lowed.279 Writing decades before the E.U.’s right to be forgotten, Posner stated: 
“Very few people want to be let alone. They want to manipulate the world around 
them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves.”280 
B. Technological Opposition 
Pavel Krčma, the CTO of an online password management company, refers to 
the right to be forgotten as an “excellent example of the huge gap between how the 
world is perceived by lawmakers and how current technology works.”281 To Krcma, 
the information age is irreversible, and the right to be forgotten is either “a funny 
attempt [to control it], or it’s the start of a dictatorship.”282 The highly regarded 
online technology publication TechCrunch offers more practical critiques of the law, 
which it considers well-intentioned but impotent.283 First, almost every website al-
ready provides users with the option to delete posts.284 Second, once information 
spreads from its original source, it is almost impossible to delete because it is auto-
matically archived.285 
Critics also attack the right for requiring companies to expend valuable labor 
and resources, arguing that such companies should not be responsible for determin-
ing the validity of every claim.286 Jimmy Wales, a co-founder of Wikipedia, is just one 
proponent of this position.287 Aside from the added burden, which is significant, 
charging search engines and other online entities—as opposed to the government or 
an administrative agency—with the responsibility of analyzing thousands of requests 
pursuant to the right to be forgotten has resulted in some unusual problems.288 
C. The Streisand Effect 
In 2003, Barbara Streisand sued the California Coastal Records Project for in-
vasion of privacy after the organization—which photographs and archives the Cali-
fornia coastline—posted on its website a picture of her Malibu mansion.289 The law-
suit drew far more attention to her home than it would have received otherwise.290 
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Today, this inadvertent backlash in publicity is referred to as the “Streisand Ef-
fect.”291 
It must be remembered that Europe’s right to be forgotten, as interpreted by 
the European Court of Justice in Google Spain v. AEPD, requires search engines, and 
not the websites creating the content, to delist links that are “inadequate, irrelevant, 
or no longer relevant . . . in the light of the time that has elapsed.”292 In other words, 
the published material still exists, but access via search engines is hindered.293 The 
right to be forgotten provides prime conditions for the Streisand Effect, which is 
exacerbated by Google’s policy of notifying online publications that it has delisted 
their articles from its results.294 In 2014, James Ball of the Guardian republished six 
of the publication’s stories that Google delisted, and provided loopholes for readers 
to view future delisted stories.295 Later that year, employing some restraint, the New 
York Times pointed to five of its articles that Google delisted.296 Three of the articles 
were “intensely personal,” and thus left alone, but the Times exposed the other two.297 
That the Times had to self-filter these stories based on its own editorial judgment 
suggests that Google’s process of evaluating right-to-be-forgotten-requests is 
flawed.298 Google is ill equipped to handle the hundreds of thousands of annual re-
quests, and journalists such as those at the Times—although displaying integrity—are 
not a disinterested party.299 Although criticism of the European implementation of 
the right is valid in many respects, the United States can accommodate a similar but 
narrowly tailored right to be forgotten.300 
VI. THE AMERICAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
Americans already have a right to be forgotten, just not online.301 This is the 
position taken by University of Chicago Professor of Law, Eric Posner—the son of 
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Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.302 Professor Posner 
dismisses First Amendment criticisms of the right to be forgotten, and in contrast 
argues that before the digital era, the law struck a balance between First Amendment 
rights and the right to privacy.303 “On paper,” asserts Professor Posner, “this is still 
the case.”304 For example, missed mortgage payments disappear from a credit report 
after ten years even though the information is true.305 The law protects medical rec-
ords and financial information, and many states have provisions expunging certain 
crimes from the public record.306 Tort law also still recognizes the “Privacy Torts,” 
one of which—Public Disclosure of Private Facts—closely mirrors the right to be 
forgotten and demonstrates the American legal tradition’s willingness to protect pri-
vacy offline.307 The Internet, however, has undermined the previously existing bal-
ance between privacy and First Amendment protections.308 Taken together, privacy 
is deeply rooted in the traditions of the United States, and although it is not an abso-
lute right, it is applicable at some level online.309 
Professor Posner, like his father, also offers an economic perspective to the 
current online privacy debate.310 Google’s opposition to the right to be forgotten is 
not necessarily rooted in freedom of expression, speech, or the press; rather, Google 
sells targeted “pay per click” advertising by utilizing a complicated and invasive algo-
rithm that analyzes emails, searches, and third party content relating to individuals.311 
The right to be forgotten would chip away at Google’s ability to target individuals 
based off of their information and profit for every click.312 
Newly relevant to the debate is the European Court of Justice’s October 2015 
invalidation of the United States’ “Safe Harbor” agreement.313 The Safe Harbor 
agreement functioned in lieu of a formal adequacy finding since 2000, allowing the 
transatlantic free flow of data between U.S. companies and EU member states.314 
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The invalidation was in reaction to Edward J. Snowden’s revelation that the NSA 
regularly accessed information stored in the databases of American tech companies—
even information from databases located in Europe.315 The NSA’s unfettered access 
to European citizens’ information, the court reasoned in a press release, “must be 
regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private 
life.”316 Whereas the Safe Harbor agreement previously shielded U.S. companies 
from interruptions in data flow, these same companies must now negotiate with each 
E.U. member state independently, and each member state has the ability to halt data 
flow to the U.S. altogether.317 According to James Cook and Rob Price of the online 
publication Business Insider: “In theory, American companies with European custom-
ers could now end up trying to follow 20 or more different sets of national data-
privacy regulations. Up to 4,500 U.S. companies—not just tech firms—have relied 
on Safe Harbor.”318 Although the NSA’s surveillance techniques are beyond the 
scope of this Note, a comprehensive overhaul of online privacy protections in the 
United States—including a right to be forgotten—would result in an adequacy find-
ing and avoid a bureaucratic nightmare.319 
A step in the right direction is underway in California, which in 2015 became 
the first state to implement a right to be forgotten for minors.320 The California law 
requires websites to provide individuals eighteen and younger with a process for de-
leting posted content before transmission to a third party, and it requires those web-
sites to clearly articulate the right.321 Additionally, websites that are youth-oriented 
or otherwise know that they have users who are minors cannot advertise products 
that are illegal for minors.322 The latter provision simply closes an online advertising 
loophole, while the former addresses the reality that college admission offices and 
future employers have become quite sophisticated in profiling applicants based on 
online postings that could be ten or more years old.323 The law itself is not unduly 
burdensome on businesses with an online presence, but, because it only applies in 
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California, businesses are now tasked with distinguishing between California and 
non-California minors.324 This is easy enough, but the problem posed by the invali-
dation of the United States’ Safe Harbor agreement will now be more acutely felt in 
transactions within America’s borders—no longer contained to international trans-
actions.325 
Increased globalization, perpetual technological advancement, and the 2015 in-
validation of the Safe Harbor agreement together suggest that the United States needs 
to comprehensively bolster and clearly define the American right to privacy as applied 
to the Internet. The California law, although in its infancy, reflects the American will 
and ability to harmonize at some level with the European approach.326 Despite cul-
tural differences between the E.U. and the U.S., and in light of globalization and 
technology, an American concession in favor of increased online privacy protections 
is now being described as inevitable.327 Further, widespread misunderstanding of the 
right to be forgotten—fueled heavily by Google—has plagued the debate regarding 
the implementation of a similar right in the United States.328 Clarifying misinfor-
mation will soften opposition to the right to be forgotten.329 
In 2015, Google accidentally revealed data concerning over seventy-five percent 
of all right to be forgotten requests.330 Although Google previously emphasized the 
more outrageous requests to be forgotten, the data suggest that a majority of the 
requests were legitimate.331 In fact, the Guardian reported that “[l]ess than 5% of 
nearly 220,000 individual requests . . . concern criminals, politicians, and high-profile 
public figures . . . with more than 95% of requests coming from everyday members 
of the public.”332 This revelation supports two points: (1) the right to be forgotten is 
legitimate and requests pursuant to it are genuine, and (2) Google and similar online 
entities are ill-equipped to act as neutral arbiters in the delisting process. 
Trusting Google and other online corporate entities with control over deter-
mining what does and does not qualify for removal—which the E.U. has done—is 
not just ineffectual, it is plainly counterintuitive. The American right to be forgotten, 
in contrast, should be tasked to either a newly created administrative agency or an 
appropriate, already existing agency—the Federal Communications Commission, for 
example—and overseen by the courts. The agency would ideally set objective criteria 
to quickly resolve a majority of right to be forgotten requests, and an independent 
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panel would address novel first impression requests.333 An administrative agency 
would be more efficient and more consistent than Google, and its carefully estab-
lished precedents would engender confidence in the American public.334 Also, cur-
rent fears that some companies are indiscriminately granting right to be forgotten 
requests in order to avoid costly litigation would be alleviated.335 
When opponents of an American right to be forgotten attack it as abrogating 
the First Amendment’s freedom of expression, they are referring specifically to free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press.336 However, in announcing the E.U.’s most 
recent framework for the right to be forgotten—the 2012 GDPR—Viviane Reding, 
vice president of the European Commission, said “[n]either must the right [to be 
forgotten] take precedence over freedom of expression or freedom of the media.”337 
This statement, translated in terms of the United States Constitution, reaffirms the 
precedence of the First Amendment. John Hendel of The Atlantic, after hearing Red-
ing’s statement, wrote that, from the perspective of a journalist, the right to be for-
gotten “shouldn’t worry proponents of free expression.”338 Professor Posner ex-
plains further that any perceived effect on the free press is de minimis.339 Before the 
Internet, and specifically Google, “the barrier of the physical search almost always 
provided adequate protection for privacy” from the press.340 The right to be forgot-
ten merely regulates a tool that for the past two decades has removed the physical 
barrier and provided, in fractions of a second, content that, while true, naturally faded 
into obscurity due to its irrelevance and the passage of time.341 Professor Posner asks: 
“Shouldn’t new laws and rulings, like [Google Spain v. AEPD,] give people back the 
privacy that technology has taken away?”342 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has used the right to privacy throughout its history to imply 
fundamental rights from various provisions of the Constitution.343 Today, in light of 
globalization, the increasing ubiquity of the Internet, and the changing composition 
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of the Court, it is possible that the Court could find a right to informational privacy 
in the form of the right to be forgotten.344 Unlike the E.U. and Latin America, how-
ever, the American right to be forgotten cannot be controlled by the search engines 
that make it necessary and cannot extend protections to public figures and public 
officials.345 Tasking an administrative agency with the responsibility of investigating 
and deciding requests under this new right would prevent such a result, and court 
oversight would provide additional credibility. Objective criteria and the development 
of precedent would streamline the process, which would eventually serve as the 
standard for an international right to be forgotten. Setting the global standard is in 
the best interest of the United States. The trade partnership between the U.S. and the 
E.U. is the most significant in the world, and if the U.S. wants to preserve it, it either 
has to obtain an adequacy finding from the European Commission, or take the lead 
in the area of Internet privacy law.346 
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